Row 5640

Row ID: 5640 | Dataset Entry | Axioma AXP Content Repository

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https://www.csis.org/analysis/back-stock-state-russias-defense-industry-after-two-years-war

This report examines Russia’s evolving defense industrial capabilities and limitations during the second year of the Russia-Ukraine war and analyzes how these changes have affected and will continue to affect battlefield outcomes in Ukraine. The report starts with an overview of Russia’s domestic arms production efforts throughout 2023, followed by a detailed examination of key Russian weapons systems (such as tanks, artillery, drones, missiles, and electronic warfare systems) and their changing roles on the battlefield. The report then analyzes Russia’s general procurement dynamics and identifies the imported components and weapons categories that Russia’s defense industry has particularly relied on in the second year of the war. This part includes a case study on China to illuminate Russia’s evolving procurement patterns. The report then dives into analysis of the Kremlin’s remaining weaknesses, which have been aggravated by a long war of attrition and which can have both short- and long-term effects on its military. The final part of the report assesses how Russia’s performance throughout 2023 and its evolving defense capabilities might be translated into its offensive posture in Ukraine in 2024. This part of the report is followed by recommendations to Western policymakers on how to counter the Kremlin’s war effort by capitalizing on the Russian military’s existing vulnerabilities.

Some of the important graphs in the report showing Russian import figures: https://i.imgur.com/tCUHF9x.png

https://i.imgur.com/PtWdF04.png

https://i.imgur.com/c5liZky.png

**Conclusion:**

Since the onset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s military industrial base has been pressured to boost its domestic production efforts against the backdrop of multiplying losses of different weapons systems and unprecedented Western sanctions and export control measures. While, in the first year of the war, Russia was largely unable to improve its domestic arms production, the analysis shows the Russian MOD was able to increase defense production multiple times over during the second year of the war.

One of the main developments has been the rapid emergence and massive scaling up of Russian civilian and military drones providing significant ISR and assault capabilities to the Russian armed forces, often launched with missiles for a maximum impact. While Russia has also invested in the production of modern tanks, ammunition, and EW systems, CSIS research has revealed Moscow is not self-sufficient and relies on partners such as Iran and North Korea to field enough of these weapons on the battlefield. The analysis has also shown that while Russia indeed improved its domestic arms production capacity in 2023 compared to 2022, it has nonetheless continued to tap into its Soviet-era stockpiles by, for instance, refurbishing and sending its 60- and 70-year-old tanks to Ukraine. Overall, last year saw Russia transition into a long war of attrition while increasingly shifting to low-cost and lower-quality weapons systems.

In this context, in 2023 the Kremlin moved away from Western-made high-end military components toward dual-use or even purely civilian technologies to fuel its war machine. As a consequence, Russia’s international suppliers also changed as more and more military goods flowing into Russia were obtained from civilian or dual-use suppliers primarily based in China and Hong Kong, as well as in Turkey, among others. These shifts in military supply chains have also led to more Russian and foreign companies with a principally civilian footprint finding themselves on sanctions lists. Russia will likely continue following such import diversification efforts in 2024 as well. The year 2024 may prove decisive for the Kremlin’s war effort. The Russian MOD, despite facing a number of weaknesses from labor shortages to entrenched corruption in the field of military procurement, will be able to sustain domestic arms production and import diversification efforts to continue its war effort. Western, and especially U.S., support of Ukraine—now expected to be resumed shortly—will be decisive in containing Russia, as well as curtailing the possibility of a direct future confrontation with Russia.

FieldValue
text https://www.csis.org/analysis/back-stock-state-russias-defense-industry-after-two-years-war This report examines Russia’s evolving defense industrial capabilities and limitations during the second year of the Russia-Ukraine war and analyzes how these changes have affected and will continue to affect battlefield outcomes in Ukraine. The report starts with an overview of Russia’s domestic arms production efforts throughout 2023, followed by a detailed examination of key Russian weapons systems (s…
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communityName r/CredibleDefense
datetime 2024-05-02
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Raw Record

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